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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS A. GREENAWALT,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN FRANCISCO,  
Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05077-JCS

**ORDER REVIEWING  
COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §  
1915**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff Chris A. Greenawalt filed this pro se action against Defendant the Archdiocese of San Francisco, his former employer, seeking to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. Having previously granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). *See Marks v. Solcum*, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend.

**II. THE COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff alleges that he was hired by Defendant Archdiocese of San Francisco in December 2013 “to bring credibility and stability to a position, office, and organization that was in the midst of turmoil and litigation as a result of a sexual scandal and the theft of tens of thousands of dollars.” Complaint at 4. He alleges that he was a “dedicated, respected, well-liked Archdiocese employee.” *Id.* Problems began to arise, however, when a new Rector was appointed, in January 2015, Father John DeLa Riva. *Id.* Greenawalt alleges that Father

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1 DeLaRiva made people around him, including Plaintiff, feel “discomfort” due to his “cold  
2 demeanor and odd accusations.” *Id.* Greenawalt alleges that Father DeLaRiva “orchestrated the  
3 departure” of a number of employees and that after a few months, on June 19, 2015, he “found a  
4 way to dismiss” Greenawalt from his position as well. *Id.* at 4-5.

5 According to Plaintiff, he submitted a written request for arbitration with the Human  
6 Resources Department within a week of his termination, on June 25, 2015. *Id.* On the Request  
7 for Arbitration Form, he wrote that the nature of the claim was as follows:

8 Terminated without due process; held responsible for actions of  
9 others; made to endure hostile work environment by actions of new  
10 rector & informed by Vicar-Admin HR that I would not be receiving  
assistance.

11 Request for Arbitration Form (Attached to Complaint). Although the Archdiocese was not able to  
12 locate Greenawalt’s signed arbitration agreement, Plaintiff did not object to resolving his disputes  
13 through arbitration, consistent with the Archdiocese policy subjecting all employees to binding  
14 arbitration. Complaint at 7; *see also* Archdiocese of San Francisco Alternative Dispute Resolution  
15 Policy (attached to Complaint) (“If informal discussions are unsuccessful, the aggrieved party  
16 involved may submit any dispute arising out of, or related to, termination of employment, alleged  
17 unlawful discrimination, alleged sexual or other harassment, or retaliation to final and binding  
18 arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, *et seq.* Arbitration is the  
19 exclusive remedy for both the employee and the Archdiocese of San Francisco”). However the  
20 Archdiocese has continued to “stall, manipulate, and claim ignorance of the legal arbitration  
21 process,” Plaintiff alleges. Complaint at 9. Accordingly, Plaintiff has filed this action seeking to  
22 compel arbitration under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4.

23 **III. ANALYSIS**

24 Section 4 of the FAA provides, in relevant part, as follows:

25 A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of  
26 another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may  
27 petition any United States district court which, save for such  
28 agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action  
or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the  
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such  
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.

1 9 U.S.C. § 4. The Supreme Court has explained that this language means that there must be an  
2 “independent jurisdictional basis,” that is, that the mere fact that a petition to compel arbitration  
3 invokes the FAA is not enough to give rise to federal jurisdiction. *Vaden v. Discover Bank*, 556  
4 U.S. 49, 59-61 (2009). In *Vaden*, the Court held that in order to determine whether such an  
5 independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists, “[a] federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4  
6 petition [to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy] to determine whether it is predicated  
7 on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law.” *Id.* at 62. In evaluating whether the substantive  
8 controversy gives rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction, courts are to apply the “well-pleaded  
9 complaint rule and the corollary rule that federal jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a  
10 defense or counterclaim.” *Id.* at 70. In *Vaden*, the Court found that there was no federal  
11 jurisdiction over a petition to compel arbitration brought under the FAA where the underlying  
12 controversy was “a garden-variety, state-law-based contract action.” *Id.* at 54, 66.

13 Federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based on the existence of a federal question or  
14 diversity of citizenship. *See* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332. There are no allegations in the Complaint  
15 suggesting the parties meet the requirements for diversity – complete diversity of citizenship and  
16 an amount in controversy that exceeds \$75,000. Nor does the Court find that the underlying  
17 dispute involves any federal question. Rather, the allegations in the Complaint indicate that  
18 Plaintiff is seeking to assert a state-law claim for wrongful termination. In reaching this  
19 conclusion, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that he was subjected to a hostile work  
20 environment or terminated on the basis of his membership in a protected class, such as race or  
21 gender, which might convert his claim to a federal claim. Nor is his allegation that he was  
22 “terminated without due process” sufficient to raise a federal question because the Archdiocese is  
23 not a state actor and there is no allegation suggesting that there was even a nexus between the  
24 actions of the Archdiocese and any state action. *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 924  
25 (1982) (“Because the [Fourteenth] Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by  
26 conduct that may be fairly characterized as ‘state action’”). Because Greenawalt has not alleged  
27 any facts showing that there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, the  
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Northern District of California


Court may not exercise federal jurisdiction over his petition to compel arbitration under the FAA.<sup>1</sup>

**IV. CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. The Case Management Conference set for **February 12, 2016** is vacated.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Dated: January 20, 2016

  
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JOSEPH C. SPERO  
Chief Magistrate Judge

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<sup>1</sup> Even if Plaintiff is unable to amend his Complaint to establish federal jurisdiction, he will not be left without a remedy because he may petition a California court for aid in enforcing the arbitration agreement. As the Court in *Vaden* explained, “[u]nder the FAA, state courts as well as federal courts are obliged to honor and enforce agreements to arbitrate.” 556 U.S. at 71.